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HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE 
Kenneth C. Greer" 
Knowledge and human power are synonymous. 
Francis Bacon, Nouum Organum, 
Aphorism i, 1620 · 
Bacon's recognition of the fundamental role of knowledge in the 
paradigm of power could be said to be the seed that germinated this 
paper. From this grew my belief, although not originally my own, that 
a material model of communication set in a social ecology would avoid 
"both the vulgar determinism and economism" of other social paradigms 
and better account for social history and the relations in and between 
states.1 In such a social model, communication is the bridge between 
knowledge and power. In that sense, communication creates power: 
power influencing the role and relations between nations, between the 
dynamics of different groups within nations, and the power for individu-
als to reach their full potential.2 In the international context, when 
considering international power and relations between states, some 
writers argue that international communication and its various by-
products are, in fact, "the root of state sovereignty."3 Therefore, 
relations within and between states are greater than the behaviourial, 
functional, or corporatist paradigms suggested by non-material theo-
rists of political economy.4 Power is more than the ability to determine 
what issues government addresses or who succeeds in putting an issue 
on the political agenda. A greater power exists in controlling the possible 
range of concepts that a nation or society will even consider to avert to 
for its agenda. 5 Steven Lukes defines this as the third dimension of 
power. Ultimately, determining what is communicated and how it is 
communicated is the manifestation of such power. 6 
The implication of this notion of power for domestic law seems 
fairly clear. With this power those societal interests that manage to 
directly or indirectly dominate the means of communication will control 
the range and development ofrights and laws. Without fully accepting 
this broad approach, I believe at a minimum, communication plays a 
critical adhesive function in any social order. 7 In the international 
system, 8 which has its own social order based on formal and informal 
relations, custom, treaties, and other international law, the implications 
of this understanding of communications are great. Indeed, ifknowledge 
truly is the basis of power this could be the single most important issue 
in international relations. 9 
Currently, there exists a gross imbalance in communication and 
information flow. Developed, westernized nation-states dominate the 
international communication system and as a result dominate the 
international power structure.10 Developing states hoping to have full, 
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sustainable economic development believe this imbalance increases the 
risk of greater socio-economic dependence upon the West furthering 
political and cultural imperialism.11 Recognizing this bias and its 
implications in international relations, the United Nations Education, 
Science, and Culture Organization (UNESCO) focused on developing the 
emerging human right, the right to communicate, in the hope that 
empowering developing states in this way would assist them in alleviat-
ing the problems of development.12 
This approach is a markedly different attempt in the interna-
tional effort to resolve the power imbalance and the overwhelming 
development gap.13 Previous efforts had consistently focused on the 
arid optjons of developing economic policy14 and economic rights.15 In 
the face of growing internal debt, the success of economic policies is low, 
and any substantive development is usually remote and peripheral to 
the pressing need and scale of the problems to be addressed. In addition, 
the attempt to promote economic, social, or cultural rights under such 
conditions often results in obscuring adherence to any fundamental 
human rights at all, confounding the development of the Third World 
further.16 With full sustainable socio-economic development as the 
goal, the economic policies fail in the face of an increasingly hostile and 
rational international market. The right to communicate and the New 
World Information and Communication Order (NWICO)l 7 are the 
products of a process where Western intellectuals and developing states 
look for other solutions to effect positive political, economic, and cultural 
change in the alienated regions of the world.18 
Developing statesl9 want recognition of the right to communi-
cate within international law.20 They demand equal access and equal 
opportunity to have their point of view communicated in the interna-
tional community. Their conceptualization of this right is an interna-
tional agreement justifying the control and limiting the use and access 
to information and mass communication systems. They hope to legiti-
mize their control of the flow of communication into and leaving their 
states and want an agreement that would allow for an equitable 
distribution of communication technology and resources throughout the 
world. 
This policy is diametrically opposed to most developed states' 
policies on communication: free and open communication is "an essential 
instrument for furthering understanding among the peoples of the world 
and encouraging the growth of free, equitable and enlightened govern-
ment."21 One writer notes that the developing state's agenda is an 
attempt to turn back the clock to an earlier "era when a divinely ordained 
state was the foundation of all wisdom and the great mass of people lived 
in poverty, neglect and ignorance."22 
UNESCO's role in this debate is unique. Pushed by its members, 
the majority of whom are representative of developing non-aligned 
states, and fuelled by the Western states' finances, UNESCO developed 
the right to communicate (through NWICO) by converging the agenda of 
the developing states- a rhetoric full of anti-imperialist sentiments23_ 
with the Western concepts ofliberty and democracy. With this dialectic, 
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the policy of the NWICO faced a great deal of conflict and is now 
essentially gone from the international landscape; fortunately, the right 
to communicate has carried on. 
The debate generated by NWICO raises a number of questions 
about the right to communicate in international law: first, what is the 
right to communicate? Second, if it has not disappeared· from the 
international landscape, to what extent does the right exist and how best 
should it be adopted and implemented? And, third, what implications 
does this right have for the development of state actors and the recogni-
tion of human rights? The potential scope for such a discussion is vast. 
I intend to give a brief history of the development of the right to 
communicate, a consideration of the ideological constraints affecting the 
debate in international law, and will consider the present status of the 
right and the effective steps that could be taken to put this important 
issue back on the international political agenda. 
I will show that the right to communicate has two manifest 
forms: one individual and one collective. I will argue that as a right it 
must be implemented as a positive right; any manifestation that allows 
for the formal recognition oflimitations and control as those referred to 
by developing states will have serious consequences on the future 
development of international human rights and adherence to interna-
tional law. Indeed, as Jeremy Bentham said over a century ago, where 
there is no witness there is no justice because such wisdom is the very 
root of justice. If the stated goal of developing states is to gain a greater 
share of international power, thereby aiding indigenous socio-economic 
development, an approach to the right to communicate as viewed 
through a policy like NWICO will result in further socio-economic 
stagnation and alienation in the international community. 
THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE 
The Right to communicate germinated in UNESCO, but grew 
from the individual rights expressed in Article 19 specifically, as well as 
Articles 20, 21, and 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.24 
UNESCO is an intergovernmental body with various responsibilities 
within the fields of its competence as defined by its Constitution. These 
include socio-economic, cultural, educational, and science areas.25 The 
Economic and Social Council coordinates UNESCO, and thus UNESCO 
reports indirectly to the United Nations General Assembly. UNESCO is 
properly considered to be the United N atlons technical advisor for areas 
within its constituted competence. These areas include communication. 
The preamble to the constitutional agreement of UNESCO-
created in 1945- recognizes the power ofinformation and communication 
in the relations between states: 
... since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds 
of men that the defence of peace must be constructed ... the 
State Parties to this construction believing in full and 
equal opportunities for education for all, in the unre-
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stricted pursuit of objective truth and in the free ex-
change of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and deter-
mined to develop the means of communication between 
their peoples ... for the purpose of advancing, through 
educational, scientific and cultural relations ... the objec-
tives of international peace and of the common welfare 
of mankind ... "26 
UNESCO's mandate for human rights advocacy is also found in its 
Constitution: 
The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace 
and security by promoting collaboration among nations 
through education, science and culture in order to fur-
ther universal respect for justice, for the rule oflaw and 
for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which 
are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinc-
tion of race, sex, or religion, by the Charter of 
the United Nations. 7 
The Constitution empowers the agency to achieve this by "collaborating 
in the work of mutual knowledge and understandings of peoples, through 
all means of mass communication and to that end recommend such 
international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow 
of ideas by word and image."28 
Using this power, UNESCO brought forward the Declaration on 
the Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass 
Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the 
Promotion of Human and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid 
and Incitement to War.2 This declaration, officially recognizing the 
NWICO policy, was a response to the developed world's dominance over 
information and communication systems throughout the developing 
world. It was also an attempt by a majority of developing states to justify 
state control and censorship of information and communication flow in 
the face of Western criticism. Using UNESCO's mandate for open and 
unfettered communication between peoples and cultures, this policy 
grew and developed. 
The right to communicate's genesis occurred when a group of 
Western intellectuals meeting under the auspices of UNESCO recog-
nized a number of specific trends in the international system. 30 They 
recommended an international agreement to avoid continued depend-
ence by developing states on the developed Western world. This 
recommendation recognized a need for balanced communication flow 
between the developed and developing states. 
Up to that point, the standard in international law governing 
information and communication was the free flow of information set out 
in Article 1(2) of the UNESCO Constitution outlined above. Thefree flow 
standard is evident in the early General Assembly Resolutions aimed at 
promoting communication development in the 1950s and 1960s. 31 The 
53 
RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE 
Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for 
Free Flow of Information, the Spread of Education and Greater Cultural 
Exchanges specifically utilized the free flow language: 
Article V 
1. The object of satellite broadcasting for the free flow of 
information is to ensure the widest possible dissemina-
tion, among the peoples of the world, of the news of all 
countries, developed and developing alike. 32 
Free flow remained the standard until at least 1975 but with the steady 
emergence of the NWICO it began to change through the 1970s. In 1970, 
UNESCO authorized assistance for developing countries to formulate 
mass communication policies based on the balanced flow recommenda-
tions.33 This resulted in an increased consciousness among the devel-
oping state leaders about the significance of communication to state 
sovereignty and the germination of NWICO. Therefore, it was no 
surprise in 1973 when the dominant issue at the Fourth Conference of 
Heads of State of the Governments of Non-Aligned States was commu-
nication. The conference adopted the following resolution: 
Developing States should take a concerted action in the 
field of mass communications on the following lines ... 
a. Reorganization of existing communication channels 
which are the legacy of the colonial past and which have 
hampered free, direct and fast communication ... 
c. Take urgent steps to expedite the process of collective 
ownership of communication satellites and evolve a code 
of conduct for their use. 34 
At their following meeting in 1975, the Non-Aligned States made a 
similar declaration, one moving further from the free flow standard: 
Public information and mass communication media are 
invested with an exceptionally important role in the 
common struggle for liberation, development and the 
laying of new foundation for the creation of more equita-
ble international relations. 35 
Using their majority in UNESCO, developing states approved 
the Non-Aligned News Pool (NANAP) at the Ninth General 
Conference of UNESC0.3 This approval was significant because the 
Constitution of NAN AP was established on a balanced flow principle. 
This was the first time UNESCO or any other United Nations body 
embraced the idea of a balanced rather than free flow as was the 
standard of customary international law up to that time. 37 Later that 
same year, UNESCO again embraced the balanced flow standard: 
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It is important that the mass media be responsive to 
concerns of people and individuals .. .in the establish-
ment of a new equilibrium and greater reciprocity in the 
flow of information which will be conducive to the insti-
tution of a just and lasting peace and of the economic and 
political independence of developing countries. 38 
UNESCO continued to push for a standard change. In 1978, it 
adopted a resolution endorsing efforts to establish a new, more just and 
more balanced world information and communication order.39 Later, 
UNESCO completely embraced the policy of the NWICO, ergo fully 
adopting the balanced flow standard for international communication 
agreements: 
The General Conference [of UNESCO] expresses the 
wish that UNESCO demonstrate its willingness in its 
short and medium term activities to contribute to the 
delineation, broadening and application of the concept of 
a New World Information Order.40 
Little has happened with this policy since. The United States' 
withdrawal from UNESCO, which meant a twenty-five per cent reduc-
tion in the UNESCO budget, is commonly cited as the reason the 
standard of balanced flow appears to be in limbo. The one body that 
clearly grew out of the NWICO, the Intergovernmental Council of the 
International Programme for the Development of Communication, pro-
motes the free flow standard once again. Furthermore, The MacBride 
Report (1980), a comprehensive UNESCO initiative investigating com-
munication problems, does not fully condone the NWICO approach. 
Today, UNESCO is attemptillg to get American support back. The 
current Director-General, a Canadian, is attempting to move quietly 
away from the balanced flow standard. In spite of these trends, the 
debate over the right to communicate is still active in international law 
and demand still exists to re-evaluate the existing global communication 
system in consideration of this right. 
THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE 
The right to communicate has not disappeared from the interna-
tional landscape. It is one of several emerging human rights developing 
and evolving as our thinking about human rights changes.41 These 
rights infuse a human dimension into customary international practice, 
an area traditionally left to laissez-faire relations or state control: 
They may be invoked against the state and demanded of 
it; put above all ... they can be realized only through the 
concentrated efforts of all the actors on the social scene: 
the individual, the state, public and private bodies and 
the international community.42 
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By infusing a human dimension one general characteristic emerges 
common to these new rights. They embody both an individual and a state 
or collective element. In that sense all embody the similar polarized 
dichotomy that is evident in the right to communicate: "tension between 
an individual's need to communicate and societal need to establish its 
own channels of communication and expression."43 
Information or Communication? 
Very often information and expression rights are interchanged 
with communication rights. In the traditional version of information 
law, much of the discussion centres around freedom of information and 
the free flow of information from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Article 19: 
Every one has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas any media regardless of 
frontiers.[emphasis added]4 
This article embodies free flow in the right to seek, receive, and impart 
opinions and information through any means. In recent years, with the 
advent and reliance on new and faster means of communication, the 
shortcomings of this unilateral approach are being forced to change.45 
Clearly, a concept more comprehensive in its approach is required.46 
Most writers consider the right to communicate has greater 
scope than the rights enumerated in Article 19. For example, the 
MacBride Report recognizes this even though it also states that the right 
to communicate is far from being an already well established principle. 
It is possible to suggest that this right will be an addition to the already 
existing rights of information, privacy, free expression, and free associa-
tion. 47 Today, a new step forward seems possible: 
Recognition of man's right to communicate, deriving 
from our latest victories over time and space and from 
our increased awareness of the phenomena of communi-
cation ... Today it is clear to us that it encompasses all 
these freedoms of information and expression but adds 
to them, both for individuals and societies, the concept of 
access, participation, two-way information flow - all of 
which are vital, as we now sense, for the harmonious 
development of man and mankind. 48 
I use information and information rights in that sense- as a 
subset of communication. While it may be true that "the free flow of 
information is perhaps the most significant component in the concept of 
the right to communicate,"49 the right to communicate "is a wider 
56 
DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
concept, embracing all those communication rights in previous freedom-
of-information and free-flow concepts and other new concepts."50 
What is the Right to Communicate and Should it be a Right? 
There is the argument that too many rights trivialize the notion 
of such rights.51 While I recognize that this argument may have some 
merit, I believe that as our concept of human rights changes so too should 
the specific human rights we address. 52 The social contract of today is 
different from the social contract years ago and different yet again from 
that of a century ago. Over time, even so-called fundamental rights may 
change. The right to life, for example, differs between societal groups. 
As medical technology improves, as the ability to provide food, medicine 
and shelter to each individual increases, and as ethical issues evolve, the 
concept of the minimum standards oflife are also likely to change within 
and between societal groups. 
Awareness of ourselves as individuals and members of a greater 
collective is changing as communication technology improves. In this 
context, it follows that related rights should also change to meet the 
different circumstances. Such changes would allow individuals to 
develop and achieve their full potential within the new evolving social 
arrangement and allow societies to develop their own means of expres-
sion. The right to communicate is part of the evolving rights process, 
necessary in the exponential expansion and democratization of commu-
nication throughout the world. 
Accepting that there is a need for a right to communicate is 
simple; defining the right is difficult. There is agreement in principle 
that the right to communicate or its constituent parts should be pro-
tected. For example, the domestic legal systems of such diverse states 
as the United States, Somalia, and Jordan recognize various forms of 
this right. 53 Furthermore, most regional instruments recognize infor-
mation and expression rights. The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights, for example, expressly states such rights.54 How to 
implement such rights is another matter. Considering the constituent 
rights of information one writer notes: 
All governments seem to agree that freedom of informa-
tion is a fundamental right, that peoples should be fully 
informed, that free interchange of information and opin-
ion is apt to promote the peace and welfare of mankind 
and that the media of information should be made to 
avoid false or distorted reports of the dissemination of 
opinions inciting to war or hatred between nations. As 
regards, however, the means of achieving a situation 
within nations and amongst them, characterised by a 
free and abundant flow of truthful information and 
useful interchange of opinion, there is no general agree-
ment. The concept of freedom of information as a legal 
concept is strongly controversial.55 
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Following from this, should the right to communicate be manifest as a 
form of guarantee to ensure the maintenance of other fundamental 
rights? One could say that without communication there would not be 
any human rights: 
Information precedes every reform. Oppression and 
discrimination must be communicated before they can 
be eliminated. The evils of unrestrained liberty must be 
demonstrated before safeguards can be devised. 56 
Given the above relationship, should communication be considered one 
of the most basic rights an individual can possess?57 Much of this debate 
about communication can be distilled into the definition of a right 
generally and the degree to which a right should be incorporated into the 
nation-state. 
In the development of the common law, the word 'right' has two 
distinct branches. As far back as the Codex J ustinianus the distinct legal 
and moral branches of a 'right' were delineated. 58 The extent to which 
both branches are present or whether one or the other is absent bears on 
the particular human right considered. Different ideological, cultural, 
religious, or national systems manifest the same human right differ-
ently. What is for one system a fundamental human right established 
on individual moral entitlement, a second culture or national system 
could define in the context of collective or state powers. Such fundamen-
tally different approaches to the nature of the right to communicate rest 
at the core of the definitional problems. 
The Right to Communicate in the International Community 
There are essentially three general legal approaches to the 
consideration of human rights: as state rights, individual rights, or as 
collective rights. In the right to communicate debate these correspond 
to three ideological models: the Socialist approach, the Development 
approach59, and the Western approach. 
The Socialist Approach 
The basis for socialist or neo-Marxist human rights is state-
granted rights based on collective economic rights. The premise behind 
this basis is that only through the collective can individuals attain their 
full potential. 60 Socialists view the right to communicate as "a social 
phenomena strongly shaped and defined by the socio-economic condi-
tions, ideological assumptions and cultural values of a country."61 
Because "it is not the way people communicate that determines the social 
structure, [but] the social structure that determines the way people 
communicate,''62 socialists view the right to communicate as a product 
of the social structure and, therefore, a commodity to be used and 
controlled by the state. The right to communicate is coupled with an 
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individual's duties and obligations to develop the greater good of the 
collective. 
The right to communicate does not have an international appli-
cation in the socialist model. One writer notes that juridically speaking 
the "right to communicate partakes of the nature of national [domestic] 
law and this concept cannot, therefore, be used in a system of public 
international law."63 For example, before Glasnost, the Soviet policy on 
the developing law of communication and information held it was more 
appropriate to use the concept of the right to inform, which was a state 
right, in international law. 64 
Socialists find comfort within international law for the basis of 
this approach. Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
allows for limits on any right in accordance with the requirements of 
public order.65 In the socialist approach, public order is the essential 
basis of the socialist system. This is not unusual in and of itself; the 
reasonable limits clause of Section 1 in the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms66 is an example. Notably, however, the Canadian order 
is secondary to individual rights and freedoms. 
The drawback with this material approach to understanding 
communication in society is that it is essentially a two-dimensional 
approach to communication's cause and effect in society. It does not 
account for the multidimensional effect of communication and informa-
tion in a social system that grows and learns and develops as communi-
cation feeds back into the communication process developing independ-
ently of the social order or as a corollary to it. 
The Development Approach 
I do not attempt to develop a precise model for the wide and 
disperse countries of the developing world. Yet, there is one cohesive 
theme threading through the rhetoric of most developing states: the 
relationship of development and dependency. Developing states desire 
social and economic development to break their dependent relationship 
with developed states. 
Communication, and the mass media specifically, is viewed as a 
predominant vehicle to act as a catalyst for development and break 
dependency.67 Unchecked communication growth promotes cultural 
imperialism which developing states see as contrary to Article 1 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.68 
Ideally, developing states view the right to communicate as having a 
constructive role to play in development, the communication of informa-
tion about technological improvements, communication about policy 
alternatives, and economic rationalization. Individual rights exist, sub-
servient to collective rights, to serve the growth and development of the 
state.69 
Because a stable state is required for development, openly 
challenging the state or advocating a position that contradicts state 
authority runs contrary to the constructive role the right to communi-
cate should play. A practical result of this approach is the development 
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of the so-called "developmental journalist."70 As with the socialist 
approach the right to communicate is a permissive right: a legal right 
that permits constructive input to "emphasize the positive, the possibili-
ties of achievement and getting the job done."71 Unlike the Socialist 
approach to communication where the means of communication are said 
to be structured by society, developing states give communication a 
specific task. Its task is as an educator and leader in public discussions 
on structuring society using the state's agenda. The right to communi-
cate grows out of this conceptualization. 72 
Common to both approaches is the attempt to control the means 
of communication by the state systems. Socialists manifest the right to 
communicate as a reaction against the capital controlled means of 
communication that promote the interests of the elite class. In the 
development approach, the right to communicate is a reaction to West-
ern capital controlled communications systems that promote the inter-
ests of developed states at the expense of the developing states. Because 
of the bias against developing states, advocates point out that the right 
to communicate must benefit the social whole first and then be used as 
a means of self-expression for the benefit of individuals. 73 In short, the 
rationalization for this point of view is that states are not yet stable 
enough to allow free communication. In both models, reaction to non-
state controls and domination is paramount. 
The groups advocating either framework often protest against 
the established international norms codified within legitimate interna-
tional power structures as international law. The extent to which the 
international legal process is culturally, politically, and economically 
biased is a point weighed heavily in favour ofboth approaches. However, 
I cannot ignore that states, claiming that such a bias exists, at the same 
time utilize the international system oflaw for their benefit when it suits 
their interests. 
In fact, the history of communication control in much of the 
developing world has had little to do with the benevolent concerns of the 
state to promote the greater good of the collective and more to do with 
simple state repression and abuse of power. Indeed, closing off 
information makes it virtually inevitable that wrong 
decisions will be imposed and that authority will be 
tempted to abuse its powers ... [and] citizens deprived of 
information be lured to support an authority which 
conceals its abuses from them. 7 4 
Ultimately, "ruling elites become aware that their limited resources and 
fragmented institutions have made underdevelopment a chronic rather 
that a transitory ailment."75 The costs to the ruling class ofrelinquish-
ing any political power is too great because money is made through 
political office and controlling the means of force. 76 Under such 
conditions nationalistic rhetoric is common as leaders attempt to hold on 
to political power and positions of influence. 
60 
DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Rhetorically and in theory there are clear lines of delineation 
between the developing state and socialist views of the right to commu-
nicate. In practice, however, they differ little from one another: both are 
rationalizations for controlling and maintaining state power. 
The Western Approach77 
Here, the right to communicate is based on individual entitle-
ment to a right that permits a claim against the state. The formulation 
of this right can be traced to the long standing rights of a free press, 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of conscience 
found in the constitutions of most Western developed states and in 
international instruments oflaw. 
Advocates of this view note its deep roots in law. For example, 
in the Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen declared in France 
in 1789 it was noted: 
men are born and remain free and equal in respect of 
rights and the unrestrained communication of thoughts 
or opinions being one of the most precious rights of man, 
every citizen may speak, write or publish freely, pro-
vided he be responsible for the abuse of this liberty in the 
cases determined by law.78 
Furthermore, the right to communicate in the West is intimately tied to 
the history and development of law through the various stages in the 
evolution of communication technology. One extension of Harold Innis' 
Empire Theory shows that changes in the mode of communication were 
directly responsible for evolutionary developments in law. 79 For exam-
ple, Guttenberg's development of print using movable type in the mid-
1400s had an immediate and profound impact on the spread and 
administration of the law.SO 
Western history demonstrates that the development of democ-
racy parallels the democratization of communication made possible 
through new communication technology. Communication has under-
gone tremendous expansion from the limited access and control of the 
printing press. It expanded from limited control and possession of a 
minority to use and accessibility of the majority.81 
Following the evolution and expansion of communications tech-
nology, advocates argue that recognition of the right to communicate is 
the next logical step in the evolutionary growth of the rights enumerated 
above: freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and so on. It follows 
that as the means of mass communication become more available to the 
individual citizen, and the communication process is democratized 
further, a greater law must evolve to account for such changes. 
What are the legal implications of these changes? On its face it 
appears that such a right, taken to its logical conclusion, implies that an 
individual could demand access to the means of communication and have 
an individual action against the state when such access is denied. 82 
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Critics in developing states view this situation as unworkable because 
they simply do not have the resources to meet the requirement that each 
individual or group must receive a fair share of the communication 
capacity. The right would also be unworkable in international law, for it 
"presupposes the availability of adequate facilities and their equitable 
distribution within and between societies."83 
However, advocates in developing states see it as a means of 
establishing "a legal claim for individuals and groups to participate in 
the communication institutions of their respective societies."84 They 
formulate the right to communicate so that it is a right to a share of 
available resources. This formulation constitutes a sharing of technol-
ogy and information between states, as well as states with individuals, 
but it is more. The consequence of such recognition is that the inclusive 
rights such as access to information, right to free speech and free 
expression, the freedom to hold and disseminate information, and the 
right to privacy will also benefit. Furthermore, it allows an opposing 
voice in one-party states to limit state aggression and develop adherence 
to justice and the rule oflaw. 
The right to communicate in the context of the developing 
nations confirms a duty on government to facilitate all means of open 
communication. This duty begins with simple non-capital intensive 
policy changes such as opening up the scope and degree of communica-
tion and information disseminated within and by the state. Such changes 
carry no economic cost. 
Does this fact imply the Western approach is better? The view 
from developed states is quite ethnocentric in nature. When advocates 
speak of deep roots in law they fail to recognize that many developing 
states also have their own deep legal histories. Such histories are not 
likely to condone the degree of censorship and repression that exists in 
much of the developing world today. However, it is possible that commu-
nication may play a fundamentally different cultural role in other non-
Western social orders. 
The West operates on the assumption that a right to communi-
cate, manifested as an individual right, is the logical growth of the right 
to information and free expression. However, the fact remains that in 
the West we have not achieved freedom in the requisite rights of 
information or free expression. There are both direct and indirect means 
of controlling communication flow in our social and state systems. Some 
writers argue that Western states are the greatest offenders of access to 
open and free communication because of control through indirect means. 
As examination of the development and use of 'privileged' information 
illustrates, the phenomena of the threat to the 'establishment' is not 
limited to poor, developing states.85 
The Right to Communicate Today 
The polarization that occurred in the right to communicate 
transpired at the height of superpower influence in the developing world. 
At this time American foreign policy was finding many detractors in the 
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international community. UNESCO became a political forum and the 
important issue of the right to communicate was lost in the sensitivity 
of the international political arena of the time. It is interesting to note 
the state of this debate today. The effects ofrecent changes in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union continue to be felt in the developing world. 
Without Soviet or Non-Aligned support, much of that development has 
been away from the collective approach, with its emphasis on the 
balanced flow, and towards the original free flow approach used for 
information and expression rights. 
In 1991, the age oflntegrated Systems of Digital Networks,86 
the development of the right to communicate should be a concern. As the 
expansion of communication technology is encouraging democracy and 
compelling accountability by state actors, it cannot grow unchecked as 
states seek their own self-determination in the face of an increased and 
continual flow of western ideals and culture. The concerns of the early 
seventies are going to re-emerge with much more brutal force. To 
overcome the imbalance created by expanded communications technol-
ogy and to preserve their culture in the face of this, states will become 
even more repressive. As a result, adherence to international law and 
human rights will fall dramatically behind the curtain ofrepression and 
fear. 
At its inception, development of the right to communicate was 
simply an attempt to push international law and international relations 
to a greater level of democratization through the creation of interna-
tional collective communication policies. Given the initial setbacks now 
may be the time to return to this simple conception particularly as the 
international superpowers are now less concerned about tyranny and 
more concerned with international peace and the destruction of eco-
nomic and political barriers between states. In this favourable environ-
ment the international interdependence created by increased communi-
cation technology could facilitate a rekindled consideration of the right 
to communicate. 
WHAT CAN BE DONE THROUGH UNESCO NOW 
Even before the right to communicate re-emerges with the 
urgency that I suggest, there may be means of promoting the right to 
communicate in international law. Within the structure of UNESCO 
there are procedures for addressing violations ofhuman rights. UNESCO 
acts within the enumerated areas of its purpose and is limited to matters 
that are not within the uires of domestic jurisdiction of the member state. 
UNESCO has jurisdiction over the right to hold opinions and to freedom 
of expression. These include freedom to seek, receive, and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds; the right to participate freely in the 
cultural life of the community; the right to freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion; the right to freedom of association; and the right of 
members of minority groups to enjoy their own culture or to use their own 
language. In addition to these rights, the General Conference ofUNESCO 
has also declared it will consider: 
RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE 
massive, systematic or flagrant violations of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms; including, for exam-
ple, those perpetrated as a result of policies of aggres-
sion, interference in the internal affairs of states, occu-
pation of foreign territory, and implementation of a 
policy of colonialism, genocide, apartheid, racialism, or 
national and social oppression falling within UNESCO's 
fields of competence ... S7 
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In the context of the right to communicate such procedural powers can 
be quite significant when UNESCO acts in the field of international 
human rights. 
The UNESCO Communications Procedure which addresses 
violations of human rights starts with a communication from an indi-
vidual or group, or possibly even a state, who is presumed to be a victim 
or to have a reliable knowledge of some violation by a state. It then 
proceeds to a committee for consideration.SS If the committee deter-
mines that a violation has occurred, it has several options before 
reporting to the Executive Board. S9 
When the Executive Board considers the recommendations it 
has the discretion to make the report public. Alone, this sanction could 
be enough to affect the behaviour of an offending state. However, 
because the committee recommendations and most often the Board 
reports are not made public, it is difficult to make any statement about 
the effectiveness of this body. 90 
On its face the process seems more accessible than other com-
plaint processes within the human rights system. For example, a 
complainant under the Human Rights Committee has to meet a more 
onerous standing requirement and a more stringent test for the exhaus-
tion of domestic remedies. Moreover, the mere possibility of a hearing 
can have an impact on the violator even if the communication does not 
get past the admissibility point. This process also deals with a poten-
tially broader scope of human rights abuses. These include censorship, 
harassment, and incarceration of journalists. It seems, however, that 
such a broad scope in fact reduces the effectiveness of this body because 
it obscures any clear definition of its mandate. As a result, the Commit-
tee's jurisdiction is often questioned or ignored thus further jeopardizing 
its legitimacy. 
The second 'question process' is usually internally generated 
within UNESCO. While 'questions' are considered by the Executive 
Board and the General Conference in public meetings, the procedure for 
this process is not defined; it remains secretive and unclear.91 Only 
resulting recommendations and general information about the evolution 
and consideration of the 'question process' are available. What is known, 
however, is that a decision taken by the Board is binding on the 
organization if not the state in question itself.92 
The variety of sanctions available through this process are 
greater than the potential sanctions from the Communications Proce-
dure. For example, the simple publicity of a public consideration of the 
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issue can be a sanction. The Executive Board also has the mandate to 
call upon an offending state to take certain measures. Furthermore, the 
Director-General can use the 'good office' process to initiate direct 
consultations with the offending state. This has the advantage of 
promoting conditions of mutual respect and confidentiality through a 
consensual process for change. 93 Indeed, the broad nature of the 
questions considered lend themselves well to a conciliatory result. 
The difficulties with this approach are the problems involved 
with getting a question through the UNESCO administrative structure 
and to the Executive Board or General Conference. Generally, 'ques-
tions' focus on issues that lend themselves well to policy type infringe-
ments that facilitate general debate about macro or global infringe-
ments. A state engaged in extreme censorship may be a candidate for 
this process, but single cases are likely to have a nearly impossible time 
making their way through. The other difficulty with this approach is 
that it is established entirely under the authority of the Executive Board 
and, therefore, it is open to the Executive Board to change it at any time. 
This constraint is also likely to keep 'questions' restricted to a general 
nature, avoiding political embarrassment for other members. 
The reference to national and social oppression in UNESCO's 
declared area of competence constitutes a potentially significant addi-
tion to policy considerations. Given that the current director is not from 
one of the Non-Aligned States, it will be interesting to observe whether 
UNESCO begins to take a more active role in enforcing the right to 
communicate through these wide avenues of authority. 
UNESCO could promote the right to communicate by establish-
ing a special Rapporteur on Censorship through the Commission on 
Human Rights. Another possibility might be to create a special working 
group on communication repression and censorship operating through 
this same commission. A special Rapporteur would have authority to 
receive information on human rights violations within the area of 
concern and to take effective action to urge governments to resolve the 
problems. As a single person, the Rapporteur has the advantage ofbeing 
less visible, less intrusive, diplomatically discreet, and more cost effi-
cient. The Rapporteur would not suffer from the legitimacy problems 
inherent in the above communications procedures. 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding remarks, though not fully expanded, do suggest 
that there are indeed means available to pursue violations of human 
rights in the area of communications. As the history of the right to 
communicate demonstrates, few states take a sincere interest in its 
promotion: state self-interest is a dominant confounding influence upon 
the development of the right to communicate. 
To say that all states should adhere to the liberal-democratic 
notion of individual based rights would be both paternalistic and arro-
gant. However, the role of communication in the paradigm of power 
must be accounted for in international law if human rights are ever going 
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to approach any level of de facto universal recognition, or ifinternational 
law is ever to approach law per se. Currently, although developing states 
are on the weaker end of the power equation, they do posses the ability 
to change this balance and affect the third dimension of power through 
the development of the right to communicate. 
Adherence to at least a few democratic principles will be neces-
sary in the international communication debate if for no other reason 
than the fact that communication itself tends to be democratic and 
moves society towards democracy. At the same time, history demon-
strates that no society has ever tolerated a completely open communica-
tion process. Allowing for some collective interests to balance individual 
interests is not socialist or authoritarian; it is simply good, well-balanced 
policy. 
Ifwe are to avoid the impending human rights abuses that will 
follow the current path of alienating much of the developing world from 
the means of communication, we have to allow for and adhere to both 
individual and collective manifestations of the right to communicate in 
international law. This will require equal desire and effort from both 
sides of the development debate. 
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